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25 October 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Clandestine Services SENIOR SEMINAR


1. Rationale:

a. In September 1968, on the occasion of the Agency's twenty-first anniversary, Mr. Helms made some comments which provide an excellent framework for considering the purposes of a Senior Seminar and the direction it should take:

What are our duties? Really there is only one that counts -- to help the nation make the right choices on the great questions of peace and war in a nuclear age. Our role is to provide the information -- and the informed judgment -- which will enable the President and his advisers to see through the fogs and smokes and murks that surround national leaders in a tumultuous world. If we can do this even some of the time, we will justify our existence. If we cannot, all else that we do matters very little.

He then went on to say that "we must never relax our search for better ways of doing things" and urged "the ten or fifteen or twenty-year veterans who provide the leadership" to avoid stultification, to ask ourselves "when did we last challenge the whole idea of doing things in this particular way?"

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b. Many officers in the Clandestine Services, including the Deputy Director for Plans, the Director of Training and his key officers in the Operations School all feel that there is a need for a Clandestine Services Senior Seminar -- a sort of capsulized Senior School for officers in the GS-14 to GS-18 grade. The Seminar is predicated on the belief that education and growth constitute a continuing task and that achievement and maintenance of a high order of professionalism requires a re-thinking of past knowledge and exposure to the latest cumulative experience -- world-wide -- of the Clandestine Services. We have learned a great deal in the past two decades. We have developed many seasoned and highly professional officers. We have impressive technical and material resources at our command. However, we have not developed a means for systematically transmitting to the senior officer the collective wisdom and experience of the organization. Exchange and sharing of experience, through which such infusion takes place, is currently hit or miss in the higher operational/managerial levels. And yet we cannot achieve our full potential until there is provision for transmitting -- systematically and candidly -- one's own experience to others and for receiving the benefit of theirs. As more and more areas of the world become at best less permissive and at worst actively hostile toward CIA operations, it certainly behooves us to operate at an ever higher level of professionalism. The Senior Seminar is a significant reflection of this need. It seeks to provide an interlude in which experienced and senior officers at an appropriate juncture in their careers can discuss matters of vital current concern to the Clandestine Services -- operations, organization, and plans. Most important, it will give these officers a chance to study in depth operational problems of the Clandestine Services, and to forward to the DDP in synopsis form and without individual attribution the essence and tenor of their findings and recommendations.

is it possible to capsule this much

depth

c. If the Seminar is to be the capstone of professional education in the CS, it must be a well-conceived, carefully designed program. It will not suffice to have a series of discussions (beneficial as these would be) for a week or two on a variety of operational and organizational problems, with a summary "report" prepared for

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the Director of Training and the Deputy Director for Plans. Rather, there should be constructed a Seminar which would, in an abbreviated and rather specialized way, accomplish many of the purposes of the best of the U.S. government senior schools. It should have the appropriate prestige, setting, atmosphere, and time which will permit the broadening of perspectives as well as the intensive study of our most critical problems. To produce a really vitalizing feedback for the DDP, papers and recommendations which will truly enhance our overall effectiveness, it takes systematic articulation and communication of one's experience. It takes stimulating association with colleagues who have significant things to say in an atmosphere of honest, sophisticated inquiry. It takes a collegium of equals exchanging and developing knowledge and ideas. It has to be a real Seminar: "exploration by highly experienced people working under minimum formal supervision of subjects to which ready answers are not available." If the participants do not have sufficient time for analysis, comparison, meaningful generalization, and synthesis, if our goals are not sufficiently ambitious and our approach sufficiently expansive, the Seminar cannot achieve its full purpose. People must not be in a hurry to "finish up" and return to their Divisions and Staffs. One of the pre-conditions for improving what Mr. Helms has termed our primary products, "information and judgment," is freedom from daily pressures which permits breaking the chain of absorption in narrow areas. The Seminar should have a real integrity of concept. It should move progressively from broad to more narrowly focussed areas, from the general to the specific, from the extensive to the intensive. It should, briefly but well, survey the political, military, social, scientific, economic, and ideological trends affecting the current international scene. It should utilize the best, most enlightening and eye-opening of outside speakers. As one of our representatives to a senior school remarked: "No matter how widely read and travelled we may be, those of us in the Clandestine Services often become progressively introverted and fail to recognize that there is a whole world out there from which we, over a period of years, become increasingly isolated." This we cannot afford. In the apt phrase of the Commandant of the Imperial Defence College, we all need "a chance to stretch the mind one last time before it ossifies." The generation is here. The time is now. It should be done right. Anything less than excellence could prejudice the Senior Seminar concept for years to come.

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2. Objective:

The primary purpose of the Seminar is to give senior CS officers a chance to discuss matters of vital current concern to the Clandestine Services: operations, organization, and plans. Of these, the most important will be the study in depth of the most basic and stubborn of operational problems, as identified by the Divisions and Staffs and as designated by the DDP. The results of such study will be incorporated into papers, including recommendations, for submission to the DDP.

*see page 3
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3. Concept and Content:

The Seminar would be divided into ten Phases of greatly varying length.

✓ Phase I: THE UNITED STATES AND THE WORLD (2 days)

The United States and its current role on the world scene. A survey of developments since the second World War, and present international conditions with particular emphasis on those forces and trends which pose problems for U.S. national objectives and security. Political, military, social, scientific, economic, and ideological trends affecting the current international scene. A word on the United Nations and regional security systems. Ramifications of technological and demographic factors and of the growing gulf between the developed and the under-developed countries. Prospect on the future.

(The foregoing, which obviously could take a semester or two to cover, would last only 2 or 3 days and consist of condensed tour d'horizon talks by cleared outside speakers, such as Rusk, Brzezinski, Reischauer, Ulam, and Schelling, and by ONE, DDI, and CS officers. The aim would be to provide a backdrop for the rest of the seminar, a world-political context within which we operate. The point would be to step back from immediate and often regional concerns in order to take a long-distance, wide-angle view. And the hope would be to prompt collateral reading from selected bibliographies.)

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Phase II: NATIONAL SECURITY

(1 day)

The nature, formulation, and implementation of national security policy. The Intelligence Community. Departmental and interdepartmental problems affecting national security policy. The President, the White House, and the legislative branch. The influence of domestic developments, mass media, and interest groups on policy. The contribution and effect of intelligence on decision-making and in the formulation of U.S. foreign policy. The role of CIA's Intelligence Directorate. The nature of intelligence problems which may confront CIA in the near future and the next decade.

(The foregoing is not conceived of as a "missions and roles" coverage of the entities mentioned, particularly the Intelligence Community, nor as a place for platitudes on coordination matters. The prospective Seminar participants know these. Rather, it should consist of discussion of the problematic nubs in relationships among the agencies concerned with national security and, possibly, of such things as the ramifications for intelligence and counterintelligence of Vietnam, the New Left, and student revolt.)

Phase III: OVERSEAS EFFECTIVENESS

(2 days)

Bio-cultural factors in understanding foreign societies. Culture, society, and the individual. National character. Social communication: thought, behavior, and language. Cross-cultural communication. Lessons from the behavioral sciences. Anthropological, sociological and linguistic factors. Enhancing personal potential for operational effectiveness overseas.

(It is odd that the Clandestine Services, involved with foreigners on a more sensitive basis than any other element of the government, has given so little attention to cross-cultural communication. Many CS

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officers have noted this lack, ascribing failures in target analysis to this deficiency. It would seem important for senior officers to discuss this matter to determine whether various aspects of overseas effectiveness should be incorporated into CT and other appropriate training. Meanwhile, the military and other agencies are devoting considerable attention to this field. One recent study, by the way, claims that there is no necessary correlation between living abroad and skill in cross-cultural communication. Also interesting is the fact that the Advisory Committee on Government Programs in the Behavioral Sciences of the National Academy of Sciences recommended: "That, in the field of foreign affairs, long-range behavioral science research objectives be drawn up by an inter-agency planning group headed by the Department of State, with the support of the Office of Science and Technology, and that the research programs of all departments and agencies that operate overseas, including the United States Information Agency, Agency for International Development, Department of Defense, and the Peace Corps, be continually related to these long-term objectives through the Foreign Area Research Coordination Group and foreign affairs planning mechanisms like the Senior Interdepartmental Group."

Phase IV: CIA AND THE PLANS DIRECTORATE (1/2 to 1 day)

A look at CIA today. The Clandestine Services mission. The DDP and its relationship to other Agency Directorates and to members of the Intelligence Community.

(This is conceived of as the briefest, pithy updating on elements and programs of the Agency of potential operational relevance to the CS manager of which he may not be aware. Of possible interest here

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might be R&D and special collection programs of the DDS&T, and problem areas in CS -- not over-all CIA -- liaison and coordination with the FBI, the military, State, etc.)

Phase V: MANAGEMENT METHODS AND THE
CLANDESTINE SERVICES (1/2 day)

The application of sound management and planning principles within the CS and to CS operations.

(Virtually every senior official will probably have had some exposure by now to formal training in management and planning. Many will have taken either the Managerial Grid or the Advanced Management Seminar. Prospective participants who have not done so will be encouraged to enroll in one or the other of these -- if scheduling permits -- before the Seminar, so that there will be a common point of departure for discussion of management within the Clandestine Services. We would think in terms of a brief exposition, by an expert, of those planning and managerial concepts necessary and applicable to the CS. This hour or two would be followed by a discussion in most pragmatic terms of organizational and management problems which the Seminar deems susceptible to improvement. One item which appears to be perennial problem is the lack of continuity on Headquarters Desks which often leads to research and file-digging tantamount to periodically re-inventing the wheel.)

Phase VI: THE CLANDESTINE SERVICES IN A
CHANGING WORLD (2 days)

Current political, social, economic, and scientific trends and their influence on operational planning and decisions at Headquarters and the Field.

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(This would be a highly specialized operational tour d'horizon, an examination of the ramifications for our operational tasks of such factors as the world-wide student revolt, fragmentation and depolarization of political forces, post-de Gaulle Gaullisme, the growing influence of the USSR in the Near East, and the declining stature of many of the European intelligence services with whom we conduct liaison.)

Phase VII: TECHNOLOGY AND THE CLANDESTINE SERVICES

(1 day)


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The impact of technical advances on operations, specifically in communications and tradecraft. Refinement of techniques to meet present-day requirements.

Phase VIII: THE PRIORITY TARGETS

(2 days)

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(Various parts of the Agency have been giving attention to this subject: [redacted] OMS/A&E, DDS&T, and OTR. The Operations School is currently studying the feasibility of a three-day Seminar on this topic which is, after all, central to the business of the Clandestine Services. It seems most appropriate for senior officers of the CS to turn their searching and unhurried attention to this topic. A recent OTR-sponsored conference on this topic revealed intense interest on the part of area divisions, staffs, and specialists in seeing due coverage of this matter incorporated into training at all levels.)

Phase X: VITAL PROBLEMS OF THE CLANDESTINE SERVICES

(4 weeks)

Critical, chronic, and current CS problems. An examination in depth of certain basic aspects and techniques of clandestine operations, such as non-

[redacted]

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critical

operational/managerial problems such as the following suggested by Division and Staff Chiefs:

a. [redacted]

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b. Despite efforts to rationalize the system, the assignment of CS operational personnel still fails adequately to match professional qualifications and personalities to particular jobs. This managerial/operational matter needs scrutiny.

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- c. The Seminar should examine a particularly difficult operational/managerial problem: the disparity between stated, programmed priorities and actual pressures from above. Obviously, White House requirements (within our charter or not) cannot be resisted. However, some reporting and action requirements may fall more appropriately within the sphere of the State Department or the military. Nevertheless, because we can produce on them, pressure to work on essentially secondary targets builds up, is felt by the DDP, and, naturally, transmitted downward. A corollary to this is the problem of maintaining a proper balance between the demands of daily requirements and long-term operational activities.

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This is the heart of the Seminar and the actual problems to be examined and thrashed out, and on which recommendations will be submitted, must be carefully determined in advance. Existing pertinent studies should be collected and distributed, so that Seminar participants may go forward from that data base. It has been suggested that the last PFIAB report, the DDP Annex to the Agency's 1965 Long-range Plan and the recent Overview Paper prepared by the DDP Program Review Panel might be useful starting points for mapping out the substance of this portion of the Seminar. Finally, of course, as originally planned, the Seminar should take up as well those problems specifically referred to it by the DDP himself.

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4. Method:

The Clandestine Services Senior Seminar should be an authentic Seminar: "a group discussion or exploration, by highly experienced people working under minimum formal supervision, of subjects to which ready answers are not available." Discussions with CS officers who have attended the National War College and a review of critiques by Agency representatives who have attended the various senior schools have provided a good insight into what are successful seminar techniques and what are not. For example, there is a consensus that papers produced by group effort are of little intrinsic value if watered down to accommodate everyone's views. However, by the same token, there seems to be a consensus that the process of working together and producing a collective paper is extremely valuable in changing people's views, developing new perspectives, and -- finally -- in stimulating the intellectual curiosity which is the pre-condition for personal growth. In the Senior Seminar we can apply the best of those techniques which have been found successful in the senior schools, in private industry, academic life and within OTR.

5. Administrative:

The Seminar should have suitable quarters in Washington, a place to which cleared outside speakers could be invited for the first phase of the Seminar. Because of its proposed length and character, it would be unrealistic to hold the Seminar at an out-of-town site.



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Coordinator,
CS SENIOR SEMINAR

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